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Abstract
This paper examines the differential effects of celebrity and expert endorsements on consumer risk perceptions 
via three studies. Using source model theories, it is hypothesized that for high technology-oriented products there 
will be stronger effects of expert endorsers than celebrity endorsers in reducing consumer risk perceptions. In 
addition, for high technology-oriented products, there is likely to be an interaction effect between endorser type 
and consumer knowledge on respondents' risk perceptions. Such an interaction effect is likely to be absent for 
products with a low technology orientation. These hypotheses are supported by the first two studies. The third 
study examines the underlying theoretical processes of internalization versus identification and shows that the 
stronger effects of expert (versus celebrity) endorsers for high technology-oriented products is somewhat 
neutralized for certain types of perceived risks when there is high congruency between the celebrity endorser 
and the product.
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ABSTRACT: This paper examines the differential effects of celebrity and expert endorsements on consumer risk perceptions 
via three studies. Using source model theories, it is hypothesized that for high technology-oriented products there will be 
stronger effects of expert endorsers than celebrity endorsers in reducing consumer risk perceptions. In addition, for high 
technology-oriented products, there is likely to be an interaction effect between endorser type and consumer knowledge 
on respondents' risk perceptions. Such an interaction effect is likely to be absent for products with a low technology 
orientation. These hypotheses are supported by the first two studies. The third study examines the underlying theoretical 
processes of internalization versus identification and shows that the stronger effects of expert (versus celebrity) endorsers 
for high technology-oriented products is somewhat neutralized for certain types of perceived risks when there is high 
congruency between the celebrity endorser and the product. 
Celebrity endorsements are widely prevalent in advertise­
ments. According to some estimates, almost 20% of all tele­
vision advertisements in the United States feature a famous 
person as an endorser (Agrawal and Kamakura 1995). Some 
of the benefits accrued from using celebrity endorsers lie in 
making the advertisement more effective in certain instances 
(Kamins et al. 1989), enhancing message recall (Friedman and 
Friedman 1979), and aiding in the recognition of brand names 
(Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann 1983). Although perhaps not 
as frequently used as celebrity endorsements, there has also been 
a steady rise in expert endorsements in advertisements in re­
cent times. Expert endorsements are usually manipulated by 
focusing on the credentials or qualifications of the endorser. 
For example, a doctor recommending Zantac® is a form of ex­
pert endorsement. Similarly, exercise equipment endorsed by 
fitness experts (as is common in infomercials) is a form of ex­
pert endorsement. According to extant literature, expert en­
dorsements enhance the believability of an advertisement 
primarily due to increased source credibility (Maddux and 
Rogers 1980). In recent times, there has been an increased inter-
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est on the part of the FTC (Federal Trade Commission) to moni­
tor expert endorsements. In fact, for certain product categories 
with potentially serious health impacts, the FTC has strict guide­
lines for any form of expert endorsement (www.ftc.gov/bcp/ 
guides/endorse.htm). 
While many studies have examined celebrity as well as 
expert endorsements, a few interesting elements are lacking 
from prior literature. For example, not many direct compari­
sons for the differential effects of celebrity and expert endorse­
ments have been made within a single study (with Freiden 
1984 being a notable exception). We extend prior work in 
this area in several ways. First, we attempt to show how the 
differential effects of celebrity versus expert endorsements are 
likely to be contingent on the product type. Second, Freiden 
(1984) focused on respondents' attitudes (e.g., trustworthi­
ness, likability, believability, etc.) toward the endorser. We 
focus on the respondents' judgments in terms of their risk 
perceptions toward the product rather than toward the en­
dorser. Also, very little research has examined the moderat­
ing effects of consumer product knowledge on the endorsement 
outcomes; the present research attempts to take an important 
step in that direction. Finally, a significant contribution of 
this research involves empirical examination of the underly­
ing processes for the differential effects of celebrity versus 
expert endorsements. Although a few prior studies (e.g., 
Kamins and Gupta 1994; Kelman 1961) have assumed iden­
tification and internalization as explanations for the differen­
tial effects of celebrity versus expert endorsements, ours is the 
first attempt to empirically examine this phenomenon. 1 
In essence, this paper attempts to examine the differential 
effects of celebrity and expert endorsements on consumer risk 
perceptions for high versus low technology-oriented prod­
ucts, and the moderating role of consumer product knowl­
edge on the endorsement outcomes. This paper also empirically 
examines when and how there might be differential effects 
between celebrity and expert endorsements. It is hypothesized 
that expert (versus celebrity) endorsements are more effective 
in reducing consumer risk perceptions for high technology­
oriented products,2 with the effect being magnified for more 
(versus less) knowledgeable consumers. No such main or in­
teraction effects are proposed for low technology-oriented 
products. That is, for low technology-oriented products, ex­
pert endorsements are not likely to be stronger than celebrity 
endorsements for reducing perceived risks, and this effect 
pattern remains the same regardless of consumer knowledge. 
The potential role of celebrity endorser-product congruency 
on the endorsement outcomes is also examined, and an in­
sight into the underlying processes for the differential effects 
of celebrity versus expert endorsements is provided. 
In the next section, we first examine the key aspects of 
consumer risk perceptions, and then follow with a discussion 
of the theoretical models for the different endorsement pro­
cesses and outcomes. Next, we discuss the moderating role of 
consumer knowledge on consumer risk perceptions. Based on 
the discussions in this section, hypotheses pertaining ro the 
effects of endorsements and the moderating effects of con­
sumer knowledge on consumer perceived risks are offered. 
Two experiments test these hypotheses. A third experiment 
empirically tests the underlying theoretical processes and at­
tempts to rule out a potential alternative explanation in terms 
of congruency between the endorser and the product. There­
after, discussions with implications for researchers and man­
agers are offered, followed by a discussion of the limitations 
of the study and suggestions for future research. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
AND HYPOTHESES 
Consumer Risk Perceptions 
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Cox and Rich 1964; 
Grewal, Gotlieb, and Marmorstein 1994), perceived risk is de­
fined in this paper as the nature and amount of uncertainty 
perceived by a consumer in contemplating a particular pur­
chase decision. Since there is some form of uncertainty involved 
for any product purchase scenario due to the information asym­
metry existing between buyers and sellers, there will always 
be some level of perceived risk for consumers for almost any 
purchase decision. The perceived risk for a product purchase 
is directly related to the amount at stake for the product (Cox 
1967; Dowling and Staelin 1994). Hence, higher priced prod­
ucts and products with higher involvement will invoke higher 
risk perceptions for consumers. Although the economics lit­
erature has identified several types of risks, two types of risks 
(performance and financial) have assumed more importance in 
the marketing literature (Grewal, Gotlieb, and Marmorstein 
1994). Performance risk is the risk associated with uncertain­
ties regarding the product not performing according to ex­
pected levels. Financial risk is the risk associated with the 
costs and expenses involved with the product, and with un­
certainties about whether the product is worth that amount 
of money (Grewal, Gotlieb, and Marmorstein 1994). This 
paper examines performance and financial risks as the key 
dependent variables of interest. 
Endorser Effects and Source Model Theories 
In the first two studies, this research primarily examines two 
types of endorser effects: celebrity endorser (CE) and expert 
endorser (EE), and a control condition of non-celebrity non­
expert endorser (NCNE). Research in the area of endorsements 
has been addressed mainly in the context of two theories­
source credibility theory and source attractiveness theory 
(Horai and Fatoullah 1974). Source model theory (SMT) is a 
combination of these two theories. According to SMT, en­
dorsements are effective usually because of their source's cred­
ibility and attractiveness (Sternthal and Craig 1973). Source 
attractiveness has been traditionally viewed as having three in­
terrelated aspects-familiarity, similarity, and liking (McGuire 
1969). Familiarity is defined as knowledge of the source through 
exposure; similarity is the supposed resemblance between the 
source and receiver of a message; likability is affection for the 
source as a result of the source's physical attractiveness, behav­
ior, or credentials. According to McGuire (1969), sources that 
are known to, liked by, and/or similar to the consumer are con­
sidered attractive and persuasive. 
Celebrity Endorsements 
A celebrity endorser is defined as "any individual who enjoys 
public recognition and who uses this recognition on behalf of 
a consumer good by appearing with it in an advertisement" 
(McCracken 1989, p. 310). In comparison with other types of 
endorsements, celebrity endorsements are more effective in 
dimensions such as trustworthiness, believability, persuasive­
ness, and likability (Freiden 1984; Till and Shimp 1998). The 
effectiveness of a celebrity endorser compared with an anony­
mous endorser lies in bringing a distinguishing feature in 
terms of personality and lifestyle meanings to an endorse­
ment process (McCracken 1989). Consumers have a precon­
ceived image about any celebrity endorser, and this image 
affect is transferred to the endorsed brand (Atkin and Block 
1983). However, some researchers suggest that the presence 
of a celebrity endorser acts as a peripheral cue and is likely to 
be more effective with less involved consumers (Petty, 
Cacioppo, and Schumann 1983). 
The effects of celebrity endorsements have also been ex­
plained using associative learning theory (ALT). Associative 
learning principles are based on a conception of memory as a 
network consisting of various nodes connected by associative 
links (Collins and Loftus 1975). At a conceptual level, celeb­
rities and brands represent nodes in the memory, which be­
come linked over time through the endorsement process. 
Hence, feelings toward a celebrity and/or meanings associ­
ated with the celebrity are expected to transfer to the endorsed 
brand through their recurring association. The repeated ex­
posure to these two stimuli would result in simultaneous ac­
tivation of memory nodes, representing those stimuli, building 
an associative link between the two nodes (Klein 1991). Hence, 
both SMT and ALT predict effects for a celebrity endorser. 
Expert Endorsements 
In a way, some celebriry endorsers could be considered experts in 
their own fields, since sometimes one has to be the best in his or 
her career to become a celebrity (Kahle and Homer 198 5; Ohanian 
1990). Expert endorsers are not necessarily celebrities, however. 
The expertise of an endorser accrues "from an actor's ability to 
provide information to others because of his [or her} experience, 
education, or competence" (Horai and Fatoullah 1974, p. 601). 
Traditionally, an expert has been defined as a source of valid as­
sertions (Hovland, Janis, and Kelley 1953), one who knows the 
correct stand on an issue (McGuire 1969), or one whose state­
ments have been verified empirically (Birnbaum and Stegner 
1979). Expertise is topic-specific; an expert source must possess 
expertise on a particular topic rather than having it at the gen­
eralized level (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979; Norman 1976). 
Expert endorsements are effective because communications at­
tributed to an expert endorser produce greater agreement with 
the subject than the same communications attributed to a non­
expert (Tedeschi 1972). Since the objective of most ads is to 
convey certain meanings and/or views associated with a brand 
(or an issue) in order to persuade trial usage or repeat usage of 
that brand, the use of an expert endorser will tend to make 
viewers more agreeable to the conveyed meanings. 
Differential Effects of Celebrity and Expert Endorsements 
The processes by which celebrity and expert endorsements 
influence consumer attitude and belief change are likely to be 
different (Freiden 1984). According to Kelman (1961), when 
the source model of a communication is a celebrity, the 
consumer's attitude change occurs through the process of iden­
tification. Identification occurs when an individual attempts 
to establish or maintain the identity associated with a celeb­
rity endorser (Kelman 1961). Hence, when an individual at-
tempts to believe the meanings or image portrayed by a ce­
lebrity endorser, it can be said that he or she is attempting to 
go through an identification process. When the source is an 
expert, however, the influence occurs through the process of 
internalization. Internalization is said to occur when an indi­
vidual accepts influence that is congruent with his or her value 
or belief systems (Kelman 1961). An individual will be influ­
enced by an expert endorser when the views presented seem 
useful for the solution of a particular problem. 
As a result, the greater effectiveness of a particular type of 
endorsement (celebrity or expert) is, to a great extent, contin­
gent on the type of product being advertised. For more involv­
ing, durable, higher priced, or high technology-oriented products, 
expert endorsements are likely to have stronger effects than ce­
lebrity endorsements. This is because with high-priced or more 
technology-oriented items, there is likely to be greater levels of 
involvement with the product purchase,3 and hence, the inter­
nalization process will be more effective than mere identification 
(Kelman 1961; Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann 1983 ). The iden­
tification process brought about by celebrity endorsements is more 
effective when the consumer is only peripherally processing the 
information presented for a product. In such a scenario, the vari­
ous cues associated with the object or context (such as the celeb­
rity endorser) exerts maximum influence (Sengupta, Goodstein, 
and Boninger 1997). This would not be the case for high tech­
nology-oriented products, however. For these products, the con­
sumer is likely to be highly motivated to process the information 
presented in the ad, and the expert status of the endorser will 
have a stronger effect (Chaiken 1980). There is indirect support 
for our arguments in the work of Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann 
(1983). While Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann (1983) did not 
examine expert endorsements, they found that when an adver­
tisement concerned a product of low involvement, the celebrity 
status of the endorser had a strong influence on consumer per­
ceptions and attitudes. When the advertisement concerned a prod­
uct of high involvement, however, the celebrity status of the 
product endorsers had hardly any effect on perceptions and 
attitudes. Based on SMT, we argue that, in general, expert 
endorsers are likely to be more effective than celebrity endors­
ers in reducing risk perceptions. This stronger effect is likely 
to be evident only for high-technology products, however. 
For low-technology products, the peripheral cue (i.e., the ce­
lebrity endorser) would have some effect, and would therefore 
attenuate the stronger effects of expert endorsers. Thus, effec­
tively, expert endorsers are likely to have greater effects than 
celebrity endorsers for high technology-oriented products and 
similar effects as celebrity endorsers for low technology-ori­
ented products. It can therefore be formally proposed: 
H 1: For high technology-oriented products, consumers' perceived 
(a) performance risk and (b) financial risk will be lower when
an expert, rather than a celebrity, endorses the product.
H 2: For low technology-oriented products, consumers u ·ill have 
similar levels of perceived ( a) performance risk and ( b) financial 
risk for both expert and celebrity endorsements. 
The Role of Consumer Knowledge in Evaluating 
Endorsements 
The moderating role of consumer knowledge has already been 
examined for various contexts of consumer behavior (e.g., 
Maheswaran and Sternthal 1990; Rao and Monroe 1988; 
Srivastava and Mitra 1998). However, no study has examined 
the moderating effects of consumer product knowledge in the 
context of endorser effectiveness. Consistent with prior lit­
erature, in this paper, consumer knowledge is defined as hav­
ing two major components: familiarity and expertise (Jacoby 
1986). Familiarity has been defined as the number of prod­
uct-related experiences that have been accumulated by the 
consumer. Expertise is defined as the ability to perform prod­
uct-related tasks successfully (Alba and Hutchinson 1987). 
Therefore, rather than being generic in nature, consumer 
knowledge is specific to a particular product. 
One major outcome of product familiarity is that it may 
allow consumers to efficiently process available information. 
In addition, the highly knowledgeable consumer may exhibit 
a tendency to delve into the details of the message, especially 
for high technology-oriented products (Roehm and Sternthal 
2001). However, it might be noted that there can be certain 
situations under which more knowledgeable consumers might 
not process the given information more efficiently (for a de­
tailed discussion on such extraordinary situations, refer to Alba 
and Hutchinson 2000). 
Based on the process of internalization, we propose that for a 
consumer who is highly knowledgeable about a product, the 
credibility of the claims made in an ad will be higher when it 
comes from an expert than when it is coming from a celebrity 
who is not perceived to be an expert on the concerned product. 
High-knowledge consumers have base knowledge that is richly 
endowed with attribute information, which allows them to use 
this knowledge for making decisions (Cowley and Mitchell 
2003; Roehm and Sternthal 2001). Therefore, the opportunity 
for knowledgeable consumers to be influenced by a celebrity 
endorser in their decision making is minimal. 
For consumers with low product knowledge, there may be 
a greater reliance on the use of peripheral cues as diagnostic 
signals to analyze the risks associated with a product pur­
chase (Rao and Monroe 1988). Any form of endorsement 
present in the ad is therefore likely to be diagnostically evalu­
ated by low-knowledge consumers. Hence, there are likely to 
be similar effects of both types of endorsements (EE and CE) 
in reducing risk perceptions for low-knowledge consumers. 
Also, the degree to which people are willing to accept a mes­
sage regarding an issue from someone else is inversely related 
to confidence in their beliefs (Sherif 1963). Less knowledge­
able consumers have lower confidence levels in their beliefs 
than more knowledgeable consumers. Therefore, less knowl­
edgeable consumers are more likely to have a strong reliance 
on any type of endorsement. Stated formally: 
H3: For high technology-oriented products, there will be an 
interaction effect between type of endorser and consumer product 
knowledge on perceived risks. Specifically, far products with a 
high technology orientation, there will be lower perceived (a) 
performance risk and ( b) financial risk for expert as opposed 
to celebrity endorsements, and this effect will be further 
magnified for high-knowledge consumers. 
For low technology-oriented products, however, no such 
interaction effects between endorser type and consumer prod­
uct knowledge on perceived risks are expected. This is because 
when consumers do not have much difficulty in evaluating the 
attributes of such products, as is likely to be the case with high­
knowledge consumers, they may exhibit the same level of de­
pendence (or nondependence) on the type of endorser. Since the 
product is low technology-oriented, the high-knowledge con­
sumers most likely will exhibit nondependence even on the 
expert endorser in assessing perceived risk. On the other hand, 
low-knowledge consumers may demonstrate equally strong 
reliance on any form of endorsement due to the lack of confi­
dence in their beliefs (Sherif 1963). Stated formally: 
H4: For low technology-oriented products, there will be no 
interaction effect between type of endorser and consumer product 
knowledge on perceived risks. Specifically, high- and low­
knowledge consumers will have the same levels of perceived (a) 
performance risk and ( b) financial risk for both celebrity and 
expert endorsements of low technology-oriented products. 
In the next two sections, Study 1 tests Hl and H3, while 
Study 2 tests H2 and H4. The hypotheses are tested in two 
separate studies instead of one composite three-factorial study 
due to the need for different expert endorser manipulations 
for product type (Friedman and Friedman 1979; Kamins 
1990). 
STUDY 1 
Method 
Pretest and Stimulus Development 
Product Selection. A computer was chosen as a product for Study 
1 since it is high technology-oriented, and also because the 
target subject group is highly familiar with it. Moreover, prior 
studies (e.g., Park, Jun, and Macinnis 2000) have used this 
product with student respondents. 
Pretest. A pretest asked participants (n = 31) to rate the reputa­
tion, popularity, and credibility of seven randomly chosen ce­
lebrities. Based on the results of the pretest, Jerry Seinfeld was 
chosen as the celebrity endorser (CE) for the study, as he ranked 
highly on all three parameters (reputation, popularity, and cred­
ibility). It might be noted that Jerry Seinfeld has been chosen 
for experimental manipulations of a celebrity endorser in prior 
studies in the literature (e.g., Sengupta, Goodstein, and Boninger 
1997). For the stimulus condition of the expert endorser (EE), 
two types of qualification scenarios were presented and the par­
ticipants were asked to rate the expertise for each person. In the 
first scenario, the person was presented as a professor of com­
puter engineering at a reputed university with strong academic 
credentials. In the second scenario, he was presented as a top 
executive with a reputed software-consulting firm and strong 
academic credentials. The respondents in the pretest indicated 
a relatively higher level of perceived expertise for the first sce­
nario. These perceptions are consistent with the FTC guide­
lines, which suggest that a person must have sufficient 
qualifications to be considered expert in the field. For the non­
celebrity non-expert (NCNE) control condition, the endorser 
was presented as the owner of "Spectrum Computers" (the fic­
titious brand name used in the experiments).4 
Design and Participants 
Hypotheses 1 and 3 were tested in an experiment using a 3 
(endorser type: CE versus EE versus NCNE) X 2 (consumer 
product knowledge: high versus low) between-subjects de­
sign. The endorser type was manipulated and consumer prod­
uct knowledge was measured (with the "high" and "low" 
conditions determined by a median split). One hundred sev­
enteen students from a major university participated in the 
study for extra course credit, and were randomly assigned to 
one of the three endorser conditions. After the median split, 
the number of respondents in each of the 6 cells ranged from 
15 to 21. The average age of the participants was 23, 45% of 
whom were female. 
Independent Variables and Procedure 
Participants were asked to respond to the questionnaire by plac­
ing themselves in a described scenario and reviewing an adver­
tisement. They were told that a fictitious brand name was being 
used and the real name had been concealed for technical pur­
poses. Appendix A outlines a sample scenario used in Study 1. 
Participants were asked to rate themselves on seven-point 
Likert-type scales with four items: (1) How would you rate 
your knowledge about computers? (1 = very low, 7 = very 
high); (2) Do you consider yourself an expert regarding com­
puters? (1 = not at all, 7 = highly); (3) What is your level of 
familiarity with computers? (1 = very low, 7 = very high); (4) 
What is your experience level with computers? (1 = very low, 
7 = very high). Although there have been concerns regarding 
the correspondence between subjective and objective knowl­
edge (see, for example, Alba and Hutchinson 2000; Park,Jun, 
and Macinnis 1994), the use of subjective measures of con­
sumer knowledge is consistent with prior literature (e.g., 
Srivastava and Mitra 1998). Coefficient a for these four items 
was .93, indicating a high level of reliability. Inter-item cor­
relation was also very high, ranging from .66 to .89 (all p < 
.01). A factor analysis revealed that all the items loaded on 
one component (with loading coefficients ranging from .85 
to .93). 
The median of the average of these four items was obtained 
as 4.0. Similar to the approach adopted in other studies (e.g., 
Roehm and Sternthal 2001), a median split was used to clas­
sify subjects as high-knowledge versus low-knowledge. 
Dependent Measures 
The dependent variables of interest-perceived performance 
(a = .85) and financial risks (a = .90)-were operationalized 
by using four, seven-point Likert scales for each construct, 
which are slightly modified versions of prior-used measures 
(e.g., Grewal, Gotlieb, and Marmorstein 1994; Shimp and 
Bearden 1982). Appendix B outlines the items used for these 
two dependent variables. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
Participants were asked who the endorser was and whether he 
was a celebrity, an expert or otherwise, to ensure that respon­
dents processed the advertisement properly. Regarding the name 
of the endorser, 106 (90.6%) respondents answered correctly, 
10 (8.6%) answered incorrectly, and 1 (.9%) did not answer. 
Regarding the background of the endorser, 115 (98.3%) re­
spondents answered correctly, 1 (.9%) answered incorrectly, and 
1 (.9%) did not answer. All the responses were kept in the analy­
sis, since taking out respondents failing the manipulation check 
did not make any significant difference in the result patterns. 
Hypothesis Tests 
A 3 X 2 ANOVA (analysis of variance) (see Table 1) was used 
to test the hypotheses. As can be seen from Table 1, the inter­
action between endorser type and consumer knowledge was 
significant for both perceived performance risk, F(2, 106) = 
5.51, p < .01, and financial risk, F(2, 106) = 5.48, p < .01. 
Since the interactions were ordinal, the main effect of endorser 
type (Hl) was examined first, followed by the interaction of 
endorser type and consumer knowledge (H3 ). 
TABLE I 
Study I ANOVA Results 
Dependent variable 
Perceived performance risk 
Perceived financial risk 
Notes: ANOVA = analysis of variance. 
Endorser 
main effect 
F = 12.38* 
(df = 2,106) 
F = 6.89* 
(df = 2,106) 
Consumer knowledge 
main effect 
F = 3.75** 
(df = 1,106) 
F = 9.17* 
(df = 1,106) 
Endorser X 
knowledge 
F = 5.51* 
(df = 2, I 06) 
F = 5.48* 
(df = 2, I 06) 
Study 1 involved a high-technology product. Type III SS for performance risk: 2,115.69. Type III SS for financial risk: 2,709.12. 
* Significant at p < .01. 
** Significant at p < .05. 
TABLE 2 
Study I Pair-wise Comparison of Means (t Statistics) 
Dependent variable 
Performance risk 
Financial risk 
EE vs. CE 
3.49 vs. 4.47 (3.47)* 
4.21 vs. 5.09 (3.19)* 
EE vs. NCNE 
3.49 vs. 4.47 (-3.78)* 
4.21 vs. 4.86 (-2.22)** 
CE vs. NCNE 
4.47 vs. 4.47 (-.02) 
5.09 vs. 4.86 (.79) 
Notes: CE = celebrity endorser; EE = expert endorser; NCNE = non-celebrity, non-expert endorser. 
* Significant at p < . 01.
** Significant at p < .05. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts main effects of endorser type on per­
ceived performance and financial risks. Specifically, perceived 
performance and financial risks of the respondents were ex­
pected to be lower when they were exposed to endorsement 
by EE than by CE endorsers for high technology-oriented 
products. As can be seen in Table 1, the main effects of en­
dorser type were significant for both perceived performance 
risk, F(2, 106) = 12.38,p < .01, and financial risk, F(2, 106) 
= 6.89, p < .01. To determine the effects of endorser type, 
pair-wise t test comparisons were undertaken (see Table 2). 
As can be seen from the second column of Table 2, both per­
ceived performance risk and financial risk were lower when 
the endorsement was by an expert than when it was by a ce­
lebrity (performance risk: means = 3.49 versus 4.47, t = 3.47, 
p < .01; financial risk: means= 4.21 versus 5.09, t = 3.19,p < 
.01). The follow-up t tests show that the main effects of EE 
over CE were significant for both high-knowledge and low­
knowledge consumers for performance risk (t = 19.19, p < 
.01; t = 7.98,p < .01, respectively), and for financial risk (t = 
12.56,p < .01; t = 9.6,p < .01, respectively). Hence, Hla and 
Hlb were both supported. 
Although not formally hypothesized, perceived perfor­
mance risk (t = 3.78, p < .01) and financial risk (t = -2.22, 
p < .05) of the respondents were significantly lower when 
they were exposed to an endorsement by EE than in the con­
trol condition of NCNE for high technology--0riented prod-
ucts (see third column of Table 2). However, there were no 
differences between the effects of CE and NCNE on perceived 
performance risk (t = .02,p > .1) and financial risk (t = .79,p 
> .1) (see column 4 of Table 2). This result is surprising since
CE was expected to have some positive effect compared with
an anonymous NCNE. It is possible that some of the respon­
dents made assumptions regarding the expertise of NCNE,
since he was presented as the owner of Spectrum Computers.
This could have contributed to neutralizing any potential
stronger effects of CE.
Hypothesis 3 predicts an interaction effect between en­
dorser type and consumer knowledge on perceived (a) perfor­
mance risk and (6) financial risk, for high-technology products. 
Specifically, H3 predicts that EE will lead to lower perceived 
performance and financial risks than CE, and this effect will 
be further magnified for high-knowledge consumers. As can 
be seen from the ANOVA results in Table 1, the interaction 
between endorser type and consumer knowledge was signifi­
cant for both perceived performance risk (F = 5. 51, p < .01) 
and financial risk (F = 5.48, p < .01). However, only EE re­
sulted in significantly lower perceived risks for high-knowl­
edge consumers (versus low-knowledge consumers) for both 
performance risk, means= 2.83 versus 4.07, t(38) = 3.43,p < 
.01, and financial risk, means = 3.45 versus 4.87, t(38) = 
4.12, p < .01. In contrast, perceived performance risk and 
financial risk did not differ between the high- and low-knowl-
edge consumers in the CE/NCNE conditions (all p > .2). 
Hence, H3a and H3b were supported. 
Discussion 
Study 1 provides some interesting results related to main ef­
fects, as well as interaction effects. Consistent with our hypoth­
eses, EE is more effective than CE for high technology--0riented 
products, and this becomes even more effective when the con­
sumer is highly knowledgeable about the product. 
STUDY 2 
Boundary Conditions of Endorsement Effects
As mentioned above, Study 1 found empirical support for 
stronger effects of expert over celebrity endorsements for high 
technology--0riented products, and these effects are magni­
fied for consumers with high product knowledge. Study 2 
tests the boundary conditions for the stronger effects of ex­
pert versus celebrity endorsers. Specifically, the objective of 
Study 2 is to test H2 and H4, which predict the lack of 
stronger effects of EE over CE for low technology-oriented 
products, and the corresponding interaction effects with con­
sumer knowledge. Although it is not very common to test 
null hypotheses, there have been clear instances in past re­
search where such an approach was adopted (e.g., Childers 
and Rao 1992). 
Method 
Pretest and Stimulus Development 
Product Selection. A treadmill was chosen as a product for this 
study because it is a product with a lower technological ori­
entation than a computer, and because the target subject group 
was highly familiar with it. Also, prior studies with student 
participants have used a treadmill as a product (e.g., Park, 
Jun, and Macinnis 2000). 
Pretest. To determine the EE manipulation, two types of quali­
fication scenarios were presented to the participants (n = 42), 
who were asked to rate the expertise for each person. In the first 
scenario, the manipulation was based on the endorser's educa­
tional background with strong qualifications in health educa­
tion from leading universities. In the second scenario, the 
endorser was presented as having won major national athletic 
championships and as being associated with major fitness train­
ing camps. Respondents indicated a relatively higher level of 
perceived expertise for the first scenario. The endorsers for the 
CE and NCNE conditions were presented as Jerry Seinfeld and 
the owner of "Spectrum Treadmill" (a fictitious company), re­
spectively, similar to the endorsers used in Study 1. 
Design and Participants 
Similar to Study 1, H2 and H4 were tested in an experiment 
using a 3 (endorser type: CE, EE, NCNE) X 2 (consumer 
product knowledge: high and low) between-subjects design. 
Students (n = 166) from a major university participated in 
the study for extra course credit, and were randomly assigned 
to one of the three treatment conditions. A median split was 
performed to create the six experimental conditions. After 
the median split, the cell sample sizes ranged from 16 to 24. 
The average age of the respondents was 23.5 years, and 54% 
were females. 
Independent Variables, Dependent Variables, and Procedure 
The independent and dependent variables and the procedure 
were similar to Study 1, with the only differences being in 
the type of product (treadmill versus computer) and the ex­
pert endorser manipulations. For product knowledge, partici­
pants rated themselves on the same four items that were used 
in Study 1, with only the product wording changed to "tread­
mills." The median of the average of the four items was ob­
tained as four. As in Study 1, a median split was used to classify 
respondents as high-knowledge versus low-knowledge. The 
same set of items for the dependent variables as in Study 1 
was used. For the dependent variables, coefficient a estimates 
of internal consistency were .71 and .94 for performance risk 
and financial risk, respectively. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
Participants were asked who the endorser was and whether he 
was a celebrity, an expert or otherwise, to ensure that the re­
spondents properly processed the manipulations. One hun­
dred fourteen (94.2%) respondents correctly identified the 
endorser. Six (5 % ) respondents gave incorrect responses and 
one (.8%) did not answer. All the responses were kept in the 
analysis since the elimination of respondents failing the ma­
nipulation checks did not alter the result patterns. 
Hypothesis Tests 
Similar to the approach adopted in Study 1, a 3 X 2 ANOVA
was used for testing H2 and H4 (see Table 3). Hypothesis 2 
predicts that for low technology--0riented products, consum­
ers' perceptions of performance risk and financial risk will be 
similar for endorsements by EE and CE. As can be seen in Table 
3, the main effect of endorser type was not significant for either 
perceived performance risk (F = 2.47,p = .10) or financial risk 
(F = .96,p = .52). Hence, H2a and H2b were both supported. 
TABLE 3 
Study 2 ANOVA Results 
Dependent variable 
Perceived performance risk 
Perceived financial risk 
Endorser main effect 
F = 2.478 
(df = 2,165) 
F = .96 
(df = 2,165) 
Consumer knowledge 
main effect 
F = 2.53 
(df = 1,165) 
F = .27 
(df = 1,165) 
Endorser X knowledge 
F = 2.10 
(df= 2,165) 
F = .28 
(df= 2,165) 
Notes: ANO VA � analysis of variance. Study 2 involved a low-technology product. All F statistics were nonsignificant (p > .05 ). 
Hypothesis 4 predicts the lack of any interaction between 
endorser type and consumer product knowledge on perceived 
performance risk and financial risk for products with a low 
technology orientation. As can be seen in Table 3, the 
ANOVAs for performance risk (F = 2.10,p = .13) and finan­
cial risk (F = .28, p = .75) were not significant. Therefore, 
both H4a and H4b were supported. 
Discussion 
Combined, the first two studies support our proposed hy­
potheses. Respondents had higher perceived risks for CE ver­
sus EE only for high technology-oriented products, and this 
effect was magnified for more knowledgeable consumers. For 
low technology-oriented products, there was no effect of en­
dorser type or an interaction effect with consumer knowledge. 
It is possible, however, that there may be alternative explana­
tions for the results obtained in Studies 1 and 2. Study 3 at­
tempts to determine the underlying processes and examine 
the role of other potential factors driving these results. 
STUDY 3 
The Endorsement Process and Congruency Effects 
Although the results of the first two studies are interesting, 
one can argue that the effects were driven by the perceived 
congruency between the celebrity endorser and the products 
rather than by the technology orientation of the products. For 
example, it can be argued that Jerry Seinfeld might have been 
perceived as being more congruent in endorsing a treadmill 
than he was for a computer. Study 3 attempts to rule out this 
alternative explanation. More important, Study 3 empirically 
examines the underlying theoretical processes for the differ­
ential effects of celebrity and expert endorsements being driven 
by identification and internalization, respectively. 
Celebrity Endorser-Product Congruency 
There is an extant literature on the role of endorser-product 
congruency (e.g., Kamins and Gupta 1994; Misra and Beatty 
1990; Till and Busler 2000). The congruency or "matchup" 
hypothesis literature suggests that "endorsers are more effec­
tive when there is a fit between the endorser and the endorsed 
product" (Lynch and Schuler 1994; Till and Busler 2000). 
Building on this research foundation, it can be argued that 
the effects obtained in Studies 1 and 2 regarding the differen­
tial effects of endorsements can perhaps be attributed to the 
potential congruency (or lack thereof) between the endorser 
and the product. For example, it is possible that the stronger 
effects of expert endorsements (in Study 1) for computers are 
due to the perceived lack of congruence between the celebrity 
endorser (Seinfeld) and computers. In contrast, in Study 2, 
there might have been a stronger perceived congruence be­
tween Seinfeld and treadmills (since Seinfeld is in show busi­
ness, and is in good physical shape). Hence, the endorser-product 
congruency (or lack thereof) could have contributed to the stron­
ger effects of expert endorsements in Study 1, and nonsignifi­
cant differences in Study 2. It might be noted that the 
congruency issue is relevant only for celebrity endorsement 
conditions. For expert endorsements, by definition, the ma­
nipulations undertaken would automatically lead to a con­
gruency with the endorsed product. In that context, Study 3 
attempts to examine whether the congruency hypothesis nul­
lifies the obtained effects attributed to the technology orien­
tation of the endorsed products. 
Underlying Processes: Internalization Versus Identification 
We have claimed that the differential effects between CE and 
EE are due to the different underlying processes. Specifically, 
for expert endorsements, the dominant underlying process is 
internalization, whereas celebrity endorsement effects are 
dominantly driven by identification (Kelman 1961). In Study 
3, we explore the processes underlying the effects of expert 
versus celebrity endorsements by examining the differences 
between identification and internalization measures in the two 
endorsement conditions, and also through a covariate analy­
sis. Although prior literature has theoretically examined this 
issue (e.g., Kamins and Gupta 1994), this is perhaps the first 
attempt to empirically test this phenomenon. 
Method 
Design and Participants 
Study 3 uses a 2 (type of endorser: CE versus EE) X 2 (product's 
congruency with CE: high versus low) X 2 (technology ori­
entation of product: high versus low) between-subjects ex­
periment (see Table 4 for the study design and results). Two 
hundred ten students from three major universities partici­
pated in the study for extra course credit and were randomly 
assigned to one of the eight treatment conditions. The cell 
sample sizes ranged from 20 to 30. The average age of the 
participants was 22.4 years, and 51.7% were females. 
Independent Variables, Dependent Variables, and Procedure 
The procedures for the independent variables were similar to 
Studies 1 and 2, with the only differences being in the range 
of products: HD TV (high-definition television) for CE-high 
congruency (HC)/high technology-oriented product (HT); 
computer for CE-low congruency (LC)/HT; treadmill for 
CE-HC/low technology-oriented product (LT); mattress for 
CE-LC/LT and the corresponding expert endorser manipu­
lations. To ensure ecological validity, the prices of all four 
products (HD TV, computer, treadmill, and mattress) were 
set at $629, which were the approximate prices at local retail 
outlets. Also, the pictures and product descriptions used in 
the manipulations were obtained from the Web sites of these 
retailers for these particular products. Similar to the approaches 
used in Studies 1 and 2, Jerry Seinfeld was used as the celeb­
rity endorser, and a highly educated professor by the name of 
"Charles Steinfeld" was used as the expert endorsement ma­
nipulation. The same measures for the dependent variables 
(perceived performance and financial risks) used in Studies 1 
and 2 were also used in Study 3. The coefficient a's were .71 
for performance risk and .91 for financial risk. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Perceived Congruency. To test for perceived congruency between 
the celebrity endorser and the product,5 respondents were asked 
a one-item question (which is a slightly modified version of 
the one used by Kamins and Gupta 1994): How congruent is 
the image of Seinfeld with that of [TV/ computer/ treadmill/ 
mattress}? (1 = incongruent; 7 = congruent). As expected, 
respondents perceived a higher congruency between the ce­
lebrity endorser and the product in the high-congruency con­
ditions than in the low-congruency conditions, means = 2.96 
versus 2.32, t(l02) = 2,p < .05. 
Endorsement. Almost all the respondents correctly recalled 
the endorser at the end of the survey. All respondents were 
retained for the final analyses because removing respondents 
who failed to recall the endorser did not change the pattern 
of results. 
Assumption Check: Role of Involvement 
In this paper, it is claimed that respondents are likely to have 
higher involvement for high technology-oriented products. 
Such a theoretical assumption is also consistent with the hy­
pothesis for the stronger effects of EE for high technology­
oriented products. Respondents' involvement was measured by 
two items: (1) "How would you rate your level of involvement 
with [computers}?" (1 = very low involvement; 7 = very high 
involvement), and (2) "How much interest do you have for [com­
puters}?" (1 = very little interest; 7 = high level of interest). As 
expected, respondents had a higher level of involvement for 
high-technology products than for low-technology products, 
means= 4.73 versus 3.55, t(207) = 6.16,p < .01. 
Replication of Results of Studies 1 and 2 
A series of independent sample t tests were undertaken to test 
the relevant hypotheses and the underlying processes. Hy­
pothesis 1 predicts that for high technology-oriented (HT) 
products, EE will be more effective than CE in reducing con­
sumers' risk perceptions. Study 3 attempts to examine whether 
this relationship holds for both high- and low-congruency 
conditions. Table 4 outlines the cell means across the eight 
treatment conditions. Consistent with Hl, the results of the t
tests show that in the conditions of HT products with high 
congruency (HC) between CE and the product, perceived 
performance risk was lower for EE than for CE, means = 
3.96 versus 4.59, t(49) = 2.35,p < .05. Contrary to Hl, how­
ever, there was no significant difference in perceived financial 
risk for EE versus CE, means= 4.51 versus 4.76, t(49) = .69, 
p = .50, although the means were in expected directions. This 
shows that the effects predicted by Hl, that is, EE being more 
effective than CE for high technology-oriented products, is 
somewhat neutralized for perceived financial risks when there 
is high congruency between the CE and the product. 
In the HT condition for low congruency (LC) between CE 
and product, the findings replicate the results obtained in 
Study 1. Specifically, in the HT/LC conditions, respondents 
had lower perceived performance risks, means = 4.00 versus 
4.48, t(57) = 2.16,p < .05, and financial risks, means= 3.81 
versus 4.70, t(57) = 3.05,p < .01, for EE than for CE, as can 
be seen in Table 4. 
For low technology-oriented (LT) products, the findings 
of Study 3 replicated the results obtained in Study 2, in both 
the HC and LC conditions. In the HC condition, there were 
similar effects of EE versus CE on respondents' perceived per­
formance risks, means= 4.56 versus 4.47, t(52) = .34,p = .73, 
TABLE 4 
Study 3 Cell Means and Standard Deviations 
High technology-oriented products Low technology-oriented products 
CE-product CE-product CE-product CE-product 
congruency: high congruency: low congruency: high congruency: low 
CE EE CE EE CE EE CE EE 
Dependent variable (n = 25) (n = 26) (n = 29) (n = 30) (n = 26) (n = 28) (n = 24) (n = 20) 
Perceived performance risk 4.59** 3.96** 4.48** 4.00** 4.49 4.47 4.02 4.13 
( 1.21) (.62) (.74) (.93) (.96) (.95) (.84) (.85) 
Perceived financial risk 4.76 4.51 4.70* 3.81* 5.05 5.00 4.67 5.02 
( 1.33) (1.28) ( 1.00) ( 1.24) (.98) (I.I I) ( 1.27) (2.42) 
Notes: CE = celebrity endorser; EE = expert endorser. 
Asterisks denote a difference between the corresponding CE and EE conditions at * p < .01 or ** p < .OS. The standard deviations are in parentheses. 
and financial risks, means= 5.16 versus 4.93, t(53) = .77,p = 
.44. Similarly, in the LC condition, there were no differences in 
perceived performance risks, means = 4.39 versus 4.19, t(42) = 
.86, p = .39, or financial risks, means = 4.43 versus 4.78, 
t(43) = .93,p = .36, across the CE and EE treatments. 
Test of Underlying Theoretical Processes: Internalization 
Versus Identification 
As has been mentioned above, the differential effects of EE 
versus CE have been attributed to the different underlying 
processes of internalization versus identification (Kamins and 
Gupta 1994; Kelman 1961). Specifically, celebrity endorse­
ments are effective because respondents experience "identifi­
cation" with the endorser. In contrast, expert endorsements 
work by the process of "internalization" of the beliefs por­
trayed by the endorser. 
In Study 3, internalization and identification were mea­
sured by using a five-item scale and a three-item scale, re­
spectively, which are modified versions of those used by 
O'Reilly and Chatman (1986). The items for internalization 
were: (1) If the endorser were of a different background, I 
would not be that influenced by him; (2) My personal views 
and those of [this endorser} are likely to be similar; (3) I pre­
fer a product recommended by [this endorser} because of his 
background; (4) My attitude toward this Spectrum HD TV is 
primarily based on the similarities of my values and those of 
the endorser; (5) What this endorser stands for is important 
to me. The items for identification were: (1) I would have 
been proud to tell others if I were personally associated with 
[this endorser}; (2) If I were personally associated with [this 
endorser}, I would have talked positively about him to my 
friends; (3) If I owned a Spectrum HD TV and the company's 
products were being endorsed by [this endorser}, I would have 
been proud to tell others that I owned a Spectrum HD TV. 
All the measures were seven-point Likert-type scales anchored 
by "strongly disagree" and "strongly agree." 
Consistent with our theoretical claims, respondents' inter­
nalization levels were higher for expert (mean = 3.38) than 
for celebrity(mean = 2.68)endorsers,t(208) = 4.77,p < .001. 
In contrast, respondents had higher identification with ce­
lebrity (mean= 3.77) than with expert (mean= 3.42) endors­
ers, t(208) = 1.98, p < .05. These results provide empirical 
support to our claim regarding the attributions of the differ­
ential effects of expert versus celebrity endorsers. 
Next, analyses for tests of mediation (Baron and Kenny 
1986) were conducted to examine the role of internalization 
in explaining the stronger effects of EE over CE. The analyses 
were restricted to the high-technology condition since the 
differential effects between the two endorser types were ob­
served in this condition only. A univariate ANOVA showed a 
significant main effect of endorser on both performance risk, 
F(l, 108) = 10.34, p < .01, and financial risk, F(l, 108) = 
6.45,p < .01. An ANCOVA (analysis of covariance) with "iden­
tification" as a covariate still reflected a significant main ef­
fect of endorser on both performance risk, F(l, 107) = 9.07, 
p < .Ol, and financial risk, F(l, 107) = 5.82, p < .05. As 
predicted by our theoretical model, however, the main effects 
of endorser were attenuated or became nonsignificant when 
the ANCOVA was conducted with "internalization" as the 
covariate. For financial risk, there was complete mediation 
since the previously obtained significant effects became non­
significant when "internalization" was used as a covariate in 
the model, F(l, 107) = 2.73, p > .10. For performance risk, 
the mediating effect was partial, F(l, 107) = 4.36, p = .04. 
Discussion 
Study 3 replicates some of the findings obtained in Studies 1 
and 2, within the additional context of celebrity endorser-prod-
uct congruency, and empirically examines identification versus 
internalization as possible theoretical mechanisms underlying 
our claims of EE versus CE. The results of Study 3 show that 
endorser-product congruency can play a strong role in neutral­
izing the differential effects of expert versus celebrity endorsers 
for certain types of risks. For example, the stronger effect of EE 
(versus CE) obtained in Study 1 was neutralized for perceived 
financial risks when there was a strong congruency between 
the CE and the endorsed product. For perceived performance 
risk, however, the congruency factor was not strong enough to 
nullify the differential effects of EE versus CE. It can be specu­
lated that for financial risk, the presence of a celebrity endorser 
acted as a signal of the firm's financial resources. This specula­
tion is also supported by empirical findings of some current 
research streams that suggest that signals tend to influence re­
spondents' perceived financial risk more strongly than perfor­
mance risk (Biswas and Biswas 2004). 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Summary and Theoretical Contributions 
Since almost all purchase scenarios involve perceived risks, it 
should be an important focus of marketers to try to reduce 
the level of such risks. The findings of the present set of stud­
ies are an important step in that direction. Combined, the 
three studies provide interesting findings. Theory suggests 
that endorsements processed through internalization (expert 
endorsements) will work better in reducing risks for high tech­
nology-oriented products, and the results of the studies are 
consistent with this premise. First, for high technology­
oriented products, an endorsement by a person perceived to 
be an expert for that product is more effective in reducing 
perceived risk than an endorsement by a celebrity or by a 
non-celebrity non-expert. It is interesting to note that this 
effect is further magnified when the consumer is highly knowl­
edgeable about the product. For low technology-oriented 
products, however, these differential effects are nonexistent. 
The source model theories predict the effectiveness of both 
celebrity and expert endorsements, though by different influ­
ence processes. This paper's theoretical contribution lies in 
the direct comparison of the two types of endorsement pro­
cesses, along with its empirical examination of the underly­
ing causes, which was lacking in the marketing literature. In 
addition, as empirically shown with the help of the studies, 
the differential effects of the two types of endorsements are 
contingent on the type of product, as well as on the knowl­
edge level of the consumer. 
However, the differential effects of expert versus celebrity 
endorsers are also dependent on perceived congruency between 
the endorser and the product. For certain types of risks (e.g., 
financial risk), EE and CE are likely to be equally effective 
even for high technology-oriented products if there is a high 
perceived congruency between the endorser and the product. 
On the other hand, the perceived congruency might not sig­
nificantly impact the stronger effects of EE (versus CE) for 
perceived performance risk in the case of high technology­
oriented products. 
In summary, while the finding that EE is more effective 
than CE for high technology-oriented products might not be 
that surprising, the contribution of the present set of studies 
lies in identifying the boundary conditions for stronger ef­
fects of EE versus CE, and in empirically testing the underly­
ing causes. In fact, contrary to expectations, EE is not always 
more effective than CE, even for high technology-oriented 
products. The perceived congruency between the endorser and 
the product can play an influential role in neutralizing poten­
tially stronger effects of EE in some instances. 
Managerial and Public Policy Implications 
The results of this study provide support for the managerial 
attractiveness of expert endorsements, especially for products 
with a high technology orientation and for targeting consumers 
with high product knowledge. Moreover, since perceived risks 
for high technology-oriented products are likely to be espe­
cially high, expert endorsements can play a strong role in re­
ducing these risk perceptions. Expert endorsements can also 
be managerially more attractive because they are likely to cost 
much less than celebrity endorsements. 
Since expert endorsements are more effective than celeb­
rity endorsers for certain product types, it is natural for firms 
to use this form of endorsement in their ads. In fact, it is not 
at all surprising that there has been a steady increase in the 
use of expert endorsements in recent years. In contrast to ce­
lebrity endorsements, however, consumers can be easily mis­
lead about the expertise of the endorser, because in almost all 
such endorsement scenarios, the endorser is presented with a 
certain educational or vocational background (e.g., doctor, psy­
chologist, fitness expert, etc.), which might be difficult for a 
consumer to verify. Hence, not surprisingly, the FTC has guide­
lines to regulate and monitor the use of expert endorsements 
that can potentially mislead consumers. In addition, the FTC 
is keen on strictly enforcing its guidelines regarding expert 
endorsements for certain product categories such as diet and 
health products. 
Finally, as mentioned previously, prior literature has fo­
cused more on attitudes toward the endorser. In contrast, we 
focus on consumers' risk perceptions toward the endorsed prod­
uct. From a managerial standpoint, perceptions toward the 
product might carry more relevance than just attitudes to­
ward the endorser. Hence, the focus on risk perceptions is 
likely to be an important extension of prior findings, espe­
cially from managerial or regulatory perspectives. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Like any experimental study, this paper has the limitation of 
introducing an artificial scenario in a lab setting, and using a 
convenient student sample as participants. However, this dis­
advantage has been addressed by the use of products for which 
the respondents have a fairly high degree of familiarity. More­
over, the use of student samples in a classroom setting al­
lowed greater control over the experimental conditions. 
Finally, although a treadmill has a lower technological orien­
tation when compared to personal computers, questions may 
be raised as to whether it may be viewed as such in isolation. 
This paper attempts to examine the differential effects of 
celebrity and expert endorsements on perceived risks, within 
the contexts of the product's technology orientation, consumer 
knowledge, and congruency between the endorser and the 
product. Future research should examine these issues with 
other types of products and endorsers. For example, it is pos­
sible that some of the results might be different if a lower 
priced product is used in the studies. The products used in 
the first two studies were priced at $999, and in Study 3, the 
prices were set at $629. A lower priced product is likely to 
induce lower involvement with the product purchase, and 
hence might have lead to a different pattern of results for the 
differential effects of celebrity versus expert endorsements. 
NOTES 
1. The authors thank an anonymous JA reviewer for high­
lighting this issue. 
2. Consistent with prior studies, high technology-oriented
products are defined as artificial and modern machines that re­
quire a high level of engineering for design and production, 
and "perform large amounts of operations by themselves" (J oerges 1988, 
p. 221; Mick and Fournier 1998).
3. While involvement may be defined by the product class, it
could also be situational in nature. 
4. While it is possible that the owner of a computer store/brand
is likely to be perceived as an expert, such a potential confounding 
effect is not of much concern since the NCNE condition is a con­
trol group, and not the primary focus of the present study. 
5. It might be noted that the endorser-product congruency is
relevant only for CE, because for EE, by definition there is al­
ways a match between the endorser and the product. 
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APPENDIX A 
Sample Scenario Used in Study I: 
Technical Details 
Spectrum Computers 
"This is the best computer for students. 
I personally endorse this product." 
-Jerry Seinfeld
(famous television personality) 
0 PC 300PL P3-550 6.4GB 64MB 4MB SGRAM 10/100 WIN 95 
Product Types 
0 Computers/Desktops & Towers/Pentium III 
Product Description 
0 PC 300PL P3-550 6.4GB 64MB 4MB SGRAM 10/100 WIN 95 
Product Weight 
0 38.00 lbs. 
0 Price: $999 
Perceived Performance Risk 
APPENDIX B 
Dependent Measures Used in Study I 
1. How confident are you of the advertised computer's ability to perform as expected?
( 1 = not confident at all, 7 = very confident)
2. How sure are you about the advertised computer's ability to perform satisfactorily?
(1 = not sure at all, 7 = very sure)
3. Considering the possible problems associated with computer's performance, how much risk would you say
would be involved with purchasing this new computer from the advertiser?
(1 = very little risk, 7 = a great deal of risk)
4. How much uncertainty is involved in terms of performance of the advertised computer?
(1 = very little uncertainty, 7 = a great deal of uncertainty)
Perceived Financial Risk 
1. How risky (financially) do you feel it would be to purchase this new computer from the advertiser?
(1 = not risky at all, 7 = very risky)
2. Given the expense involved with purchasing this computer, how much is the risk involved in purchasing this computer from
the advertiser?
(1 = not much risk, 7 = very high risk)
3. Considering the amount of money associated with purchasing a new computer, how risky is the purchase from this advertiser?
(1 = not risky at all, 7 = very risky)
4. How much financial risk is involved while purchasing this computer from the advertiser?
(1 = very little risk, 7 = a great deal of risk)
